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In 2005, Austria modified its group taxation regime and now provides an option for cross-
border loss-offset. We analyse the combined impact of Austria's new group taxation and loss-
offset limitations on cross-border investment decisions of domestic corporations. Monte Carlo 
simulations in an inter-temporal setting reveal that the impact on foreign real investment 
induced by the new group taxation is ambiguous. Whereas marginal investment projects with 
decreasing cash flows tend to benefit from group taxation, innovative projects with initial 
losses and increasing cash flows may be discriminated against. Investors should consider 
domestic income and repatriation policy simultaneously before opting for group taxation. 
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 Group Taxation, Asymmetric Taxation and Cross-Border 
Investment Incentives in Austria 
 
1  Introduction 
In most countries, companies limited by shares and limited liability companies are subject to 
corporate income tax. Whereas corporate groups have to deliver consolidated financial 
statements for financial accounting purposes, they are not allowed to file consolidated tax 
statements. Instead, the parent company and its subsidiaries are taxed separately. Separate 
taxation ignores the fact that a corporate group constitutes an economic unit. As a consequence, 
many countries relaxed separate taxation for corporate groups and introduced group taxation 
regimes
1. Group taxation regimes create tax integration by assigning all profits and losses within 
the corporate group to the parent company. Thus, group taxation provides an intra-group loss-
offset. 
In 2005, Austrian group taxation was modified substantially. Until 2004, group taxation could 
only be established between domestic corporations, while foreign subsidiaries were excluded 
from Austrian tax groups. Now, foreign subsidiaries can be integrated as well. By allowing for 
cross-border loss-offset, the tax legislator intended to improve Austria’s attractiveness as a 
location for holding companies
2. This policy was mainly triggered by tax competition from the 
new Eastern European EU member states. Moreover, the tax reform anticipates EU anti-
discrimination rules. The European Court of Justice is expected to declare group taxation 
regimes which exclude foreign subsidiaries unlawful
3. As a consequence, all member states 
would have to adapt their group taxation regimes. We therefore analyse from an economic 
perspective whether the Austrian tax reform can serve as a model for future European group 
taxation. 
The Austrian tax literature widely appreciated the new group taxation
4. However, its investment 
incentives are still unknown. In particular, the interaction of group taxation and asymmetric 
taxation of profits and losses remains to be analysed. The investment effects of group taxation 
are characterised by their relative impact on the different investment alternatives. We look at a 
                                                 
1  Cf. Russo (2005), p. 7. 
2 Cf. reasons given for the draft law, Begründung des Gesetzentwurfs, Erläuterungen, Allg. Teil, B, 
http://www.bmf.gv.at/steuern/Neue Gesetze/Steuerreform/Erlaeuterungen.pdf (Download of 08.11.2004). 
3  European Court of Justice, reference dated 16.07.2003, Case C-446/03 (Marks & Spencer plc), order of the High 
Court of Justice of England and Wales for a preliminary ruling, OJ C-304/18 of 13.12.2003. 
4  See, e.g., Gassner/Haidenthaler (2004) and the articles in Mühlehner/Zöchling (2004).   2 
two-stage corporate group. The parent company is located in Austria, while the subsidiary is 
based in another EU member state. In our investment model, the alternatives are real versus 
financial investment, both of which can be carried out either domestically by the parent company 
or in the foreign country by the subsidiary. If foreign real or financial investment is chosen, the 
investor decides whether or not to opt for group taxation. 
This paper addresses the following questions: 
•  Does Austrian group taxation favour either domestic or foreign activities? 
•  Does Austrian group taxation favour either real or financial investment? 
Our results will indicate whether group taxation actually improves Austria’s attractiveness for 
setting up holding companies or whether unintended investment incentives prevail. The issue is 
relevant from an individual as well as a fiscal perspective. On the one hand, investors are given 
support for their individual investment decisions. On the other hand, tax authorities gain an 
insight into the effects of group taxation regimes, which can be used for improved predictions of 
tax revenue and better control of fiscal policy. As investment decisions are essentially multi-
period decisions, we will use an individual dynamic investment model to evaluate Austrian 
group taxation. In order to analyse the combined effects of group taxation and loss-offset 
restrictions under uncertainty, we perform Monte Carlo simulations. 
 
2  Literature 
The existing literature on Austrian group taxation is mainly written from a tax law perspective
5. 
It merely focuses on practical problems like the preconditions for group membership, minimum 
share requirements, or the choice of the optimal fiscal year. Only a few analytical papers on the 
investment incentives of group taxation have been published until now
6. In contrast, the 
international literature on asymmetric taxation has an economic perspective and emphasises 
investment effects
7. 
Optimal repatriation and financing strategies of multinational corporations and the optimal legal 
                                                 
5  Cf. Bartl (2004) and, e.g., the articles in Mühlehner/Zöchling (2004). 
6  Cf. Pummerer (2004). 
7  See, e.g., Barlev/Levy (1975), Auerbach (1986), Auerbach/Poterba (1987), MacKie-Mason (1990). For empirical 
evidence see, e.g., Altshuler/Auerbach (1990). The literature emphasizes the similarities between the tax claim 
and a call option. Cf. Ball/Bowers (1982), Majd/Myers (1985), Majd/Myers (1987), Lund (2000).   3 
structure of foreign activities are major issues in the literature on international taxation
8. For both 
decisions, taxation is typically assumed as being symmetrical. In contrast, the literature on 
asymmetric taxation widely neglects international aspects. The investment effects of loss-offset 
limitations are rarely analysed in a cross-border setting. Examples are Lyon/Silverstein, who 
analyse the effects of the U.S. alternative minimum tax on multi-national corporations
9, and 
Gérard/Weiner, who focus on loss-offset restrictions under formula apportionment
10. The impact 
of group taxation regimes on domestic versus cross-border investment decisions and on real 
versus financial investment has not been investigated until now. 
In this paper, we try to eliminate this shortcoming by simultaneously analysing the investment 
incentives of the new Austrian group taxation and loss-offset limitations. 
 
3  Model design 
3.1  Investment model 
At time 0 = t , an investor with a finite time horizon of n periods decides to invest equity capital 
0 I . The investor either acquires a real investment project with cash flows  ) , , 1 ( n t CFt … =  or a 
financial investment with the constant pre-tax interest rate i. In the case of negative cash flows 
the investor can borrow at the same ratei. 
The investor (parent company) is an Austrian corporation. It can either invest in the domestic 
market for its own account or establish a 100% subsidiary that invests in the foreign country. The 
choices of location and legal structure at time  0 = t  are irreversible and cannot be revised during 
the planning period. 
By optimally choosing its activities at time  0 = t , the parent company maximises its future value 
at time  n t = . The parent company does not pay dividends during the time interval[[ n ; 0 . Profits 
are fully retained. Thus, all cash flows from real or financial investments are re-invested at the 
interest rate i until the time horizon n is reached. 
In principle, a neutral system of business taxation has to take all taxes on all levels into 
                                                 
8  Cf., e.g., Alworth (1988), Altshuler/Grubert (2002), Gordon/Jun (1993). 
9   Cf. Lyon/Silverstein (1995). 
10  Cf. Gérard/Weiner (2003).   4 
account
11. A complete tax model of a corporate group therefore includes the parent company’s 
taxes, the taxes of all levels of subsidiaries, and taxes of the parent company’s shareholders. For 
reasons of complexity, the parent company’s shareholders will be neglected in our model. In a 
multi-period setting, the optimisation of repatriation policy under asymmetric taxation typically 
involves non-linear mixed-integer optimisation problems. These problems are notoriously hard 
to solve, even if group taxation regimes are neglected. To justify our method of procedure, we 
assume that the investment alternative which yields the maximum future value on the corporate 
level corresponds to that with the maximum future value on the shareholders’ individual level. 
 
3.2  Tax assumptions 
Our model focuses on the investment effects of group taxation regimes and loss-offset 
restrictions. We therefore assume that the tax base is defined similarly in both countries. The tax 
base is calculated as cash flows  t CF  minus depreciation allowances  t δ . Other non-cash accruals 
shall not exist
12. Credit (debit) interest payments are fully taxable (tax-deductible) at the usual 
tax rate
13. As a pre-stage towards the tax base, the earnings of a group member
14 are denoted by 
t E
15. In addition, the parent company may have exogenously-given domestic income denoted by 
t DE , which may be positive or negative. Since  t DE  is included in taxable income, it is relevant 
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where  t Int  denotes the interest income realised by the parent (P) or subsidiary (S). 
To isolate the effects of group taxation under limited loss-offset, we assume identical rules for 
depreciation allowances  t δ  in both countries. In accordance with Austrian tax law, linear 
                                                 
11  Cf. Scholes et al. (2005). 
12 Depreciation allowances on the subsidiary’s book value are neglected because these items are non-deductible 
under the exemption method in both the domestic and cross-border case. 
13 For corporations, the withholding tax on interest income (Kapitalertragsteuer) is not a final tax. There are no tax 
allowances. 
14 Cf. § 9 (6) no. 1 KStG (Austrian corporate income tax code). 
15 Superscripts
P denote variables related to the parent company, superscripts
S relate to the foreign subsidiary.   5 
depreciation allowances are granted for an economic life of n periods
16. If a group member only 
realises financial investment, its earnings  t E  only consist of interest income:  0 = = t t CF δ ; 
() t t t DE Int E + = . 
There are two alternatives for taxing corporate groups: separate taxation and group taxation. If 
the parent company does not opt for group taxation, the parent company and the subsidiary are 
taxed separately. The subsidiary’s earnings or losses are not taxed in the parent company’s home 
country, as in this case the exemption method applies. In contrast, if a tax group is established, 
the subsidiary’s losses can be set off against the parent company’s domestic profits, but not vice 
versa. The preliminary sum of earnings  pre t SoE ,  prior to subsequent taxation is calculated as 
follows: 
(2)   { }
.
















L I ) 1 , 0 (  is a binary variable that indicates whether group taxation is applied ( 1 ) 1 , 0 ( =
L I ) or not 
) 0 ( ) 1 , 0 ( =
L I . In our model, the option for group taxation is assumed irreversible
17. 
If the foreign subsidiary incurs losses, the foreign country typically grants a tax loss carry-
forward. The subsidiary’s loss carry-forwards can be set off against its own future profits (loss 
deduction). Under group taxation, the parent company has to make up for the subsidiary’s loss 
deduction in order to prevent a double loss-offset. The parent company’s domestic taxable 
income therefore increases by the former loss-offset. This procedure is called subsequent 
taxation. Subsequent taxation ensures that foreign losses are set off exactly once: At the first 
stage, the foreign loss is set off against domestic profits. At the second stage, the foreign 
subsidiary carries forward its remaining loss while subsequent taxation takes place in the 
domestic country
18. The same sequence applies for losses of foreign branches which are 
exempted according to double taxation agreements
19. 
In contrast to foreign losses, foreign profits are not recognised but have to be exempted from 
                                                 
16 Cf. § 7 (1) EStG (Austrian individual income tax code; widely applicable to corporations, too). 
17 According to § 10 (10) KStG, a tax group must be constituted for at least 3 years. Due to transaction costs, 
frequent changes of a tax group’s composition are unlikely. 
18 Cf. Treisch (2004), pp. 238 ff., 261 ff. for loss-offset with subsequent taxation. 
19 Cf. verdict by Austria’s supreme court (VwGH-cognizance 25.9.2001, 99/14/0217 E, Internationales Steuerrecht 
2001, 754, RL 7605 ff. EStR (Austrian individual income tax code instructions).   6 
domestic taxation
20. Dividends paid by the foreign subsidiary remain tax-free in the parent 
company’s home state
21. 
The current loss deduction – use of loss carry-forwards in the current period – is defined as the 
difference between the sum of earnings  t SoE  and the tax base  t TB , and is denoted by 
t LD : t t t TB SoE LD − = . Taking subsequent taxation into account, the parent company’s (final) 
sum of earnings can be computed as: 
(3)   { } { } (0,1) (0,1) min 0; max 0;
P PL S L S
tt t t SoE E I E I LD =+ ⋅ + ⋅ . 
Since 2001, Austrian tax law has restricted loss deductions. The use of loss carry-forwards is 
limited to 75% of the current sum of earnings
22. This provision implies a minimum tax base
23 of 
at least  % 25 = α  of positive profits, regardless of existing loss carry-forwards. A time limit for 
loss carry-forwards does not exist
24. As a result, the tax base  t TB  is defined as the maximum of 
the sum of earnings minus loss carry-forward at the beginning of the period, and the minimum 
taxable fraction of profits. If the sum of earnings is negative, the tax base equals zero: 
(4)   {} . ; ; 0 max 1 t t t t SoE LC SoE TB ⋅ − = − α  
Here,  t LC  denotes the loss carry-forward at the end of period t. 
We assume that the foreign country does not apply a minimum tax. With the foreign corporate 
tax rate 
S τ  being proportional, the subsidiary’s tax payment 
S




t TB T ⋅ =τ . According to 
EU law, withholding taxes (Kapitalertragsteuer) neither exist on dividends nor on liquidation 
proceeds
25. Hence, the parent company’s tax payment Tt




t TB T ⋅ =τ . 
                                                 
20 For domestic group members, full integration of profits and losses is obligatory. 
21 Cf. § 10 (2, 3) KStG. Minimum holding periods do not exist (option right; Article 3 (2) 2. alternative P-S-D. P-
S-D: Parent-Subsidiary-Directive. Council Directive of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation 
applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (90/435/EEC), OJ 1990, 
L 225/6-9, amended in OJ 1990, L 266/20. Changed by Directive 2003/123/EC of 22.12.2003, OJ 2004, L 7/41-
44.). Profits and losses from liquidating subsidiaries are taxed asymmetrically under Austrian tax law. Profits 
from liquidations are tax-exempt like dividends (§ 10 (2) KStG). Losses from liquidations can be deducted as far 
as they exceed tax-free dividends received in the previous 5 years (§ 10 (3) KStG). 
22 Cf. § 27 (2) KStG in connection with § 2 (2b) EStG. 
23 This type of minimum tax should not be confused with the U.S. alternative minimum tax, which is a parallel tax 
system with its own tax base and tax rate. 
24 Until 1990, Austria applied a time limit on loss carry-forwards of 7 years. 
25 Art. 5 (1) P-S-D. We neglect the special treatment of distributions following a liquidation, which are explicitly 
exempted from P-S-D (article 4 (1) P-S-D). We assume that the home state of the subsidiary does not levy a 
withholding tax on liquidation proceeds.   7 
 
3.3  Measuring tax effects 
As stated above, the parent company maximises its future value at the time horizon  n t = . 
Consequently, the investment effects of the group taxation and loss-offset limitations are 
quantified by differences in future values. The future value of an investment alternative is given 
by the final account balance  n FI , which is calculated on the basis of a cash flow statement: 
(5)  
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S  denotes the dividends paid by the subsidiary. If financial investment is chosen in  0 = t , the 
account balance is reduced to: 
(6)  
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Dividend restrictions imposed by financial accounting are taken into account
26. Thus, the 
subsidiary can only pay dividends if the financial accounting statement displays a profit and if 
there is no loss carry-forward. The repatriation policy is determined by the difference in the 
nominal tax rates: Profits are fully distributed if the foreign corporate tax rate exceeds the 
domestic one. Otherwise, profits are retained until the time horizon  n t = . Technically, the 
dividend payments are defined as follows: 
(7)   {}
.
otherwise 0
0   if ; 0 max 1
⎩
⎨
















The subsidiary is liquidated at the time horizon  n t = . Then, its account balance 
S
n FI  is 
distributed to the parent company
27. Liquidating the subsidiary does not induce an additional tax 
payment in the foreign country because all profits have already been subject to tax. 
A remaining loss carry-forward at the time horizon  n t =  can no longer be set off. For computing 
the future value, however, it is included by means of a lump-sum valuation. Although the parent 
                                                 
26 In Austria, financial accounting has an authoritative function for tax purposes for most items. 
27 The parent company pays for possible debts of the subsidiary.   8 
company terminates its economic activities at  n t = , other taxpayers might still utilise its loss 
carry-forward, at least to a limited degree. In our simulations, remaining loss carry-forwards of 
the parent company and the subsidiary are valued at  % 40 = β  of face value
28. This means that 
the parent company receives a virtual cash receipt of  n LC ⋅ ⋅τ β  . 
Computing the parent company’s future value requires a separate cash flow statement. The 
parent company’s balance account at time t amounts to: 
(8)  



















The future value at the time horizon 
P
n FV  is defined as the sum of the balance account and the 
loss carry-forwards valued on a lump-sum basis: 








n LC LC FI FV ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + = τ τ β  
Under Austrian tax law, profits from liquidating a subsidiary are tax-exempt
29. Liquidation 
losses are tax-deductible, however, if they exceed the last 5 years’ tax-free dividends. Hence, the 
parent company’s total tax payment in the final period  n t =  is given by: 
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4  Monte Carlo simulations 
4.1  Model setup 
Modelling loss-offset limitations and group taxation rules requires integrating non-linear and 
state-dependent algebraic functions. Thus, closed-form solutions of the underlying investment 
problem are unlikely. Even analysing two or three periods is too complicated
30. Numerical 
simulations based on cash flow statements, however, can be easily applied. In order to extract 
                                                 
28 Empirical evidence indicates that loss carry-forwards were sold at 25% of face value in Germany in 1987. Cf. 
Schneider (1988), p. 1222. At the former corporate tax rate of about 60%, this fraction implies a β -value of 
approximately 0.4. 
29 Cf. § 10 (3) KStG. 
30 This is even true for asymmetric taxation of profits and losses in the domestic case. See, e.g., Niemann (2004).   9 
representative information from numerical cash flow statements, cash flows are modelled as 
random variables. Projects with different cash flow structures and different expected rates of 
return are influenced differently by loss-offset restrictions and group taxation regimes. For this 
reason, it is necessary to vary these parameters. 
We start our analysis with a deterministic value for the initial cash flow  0 CF  and assume that the 
increments  t ε  from period  1 − t  to period t are independent and identically distributed with 
mean µ  and variance  ² σ :
31 
(11)  . ,..., 1 ) ² , ( 1 n t N CF CF
iid t t t = ∼ = − − σ µ ε  
Varying the mean µ  results in different cash flow structures. Cash flows that are expected to 
increase (decrease) over time are represented by  0 > µ  ) 0 ( < µ . The effects of loss-offset 
limitations are also determined by a project’s expected rate of return. As infra-marginal projects 
are unlikely to suffer losses, group taxation regimes and loss-offset rules will have little impact 
on infra-marginal projects. Expected marginal projects, in contrast, are characterised by a higher 
probability for losses. This means that loss-offset rules may influence investment decisions. 
Consequently, the following simulations are based on marginal (infra-marginal) projects with 
expected rates of return of 10% (20%). 
Since nominal tax rates have a decisive impact on international location decisions, we 
differentiate between high-tax and low-tax foreign countries. In our simulations, the high-tax 
country levies a nominal tax rate of  % 38 =
S τ , reflecting the combined corporate and municipal 
tax rate in Germany. In the low-tax country, the tax rate is  % 19 =
S τ , which, e.g., applies for 
Slovakia. 
Whether a tax group should be established crucially depends on the level of domestic income. 
This is especially true for holding companies without domestic operating activities, because 
filing for foreign losses is pointless without domestic profits. We therefore simulate 
exogenously-given domestic income  t DE  at a level of –50,000, 0, and +50,000 p.a.
32 Additional 
parameters applied in the simulations are: 
                                                 
31 Cf. Niemann (2004), p. 14. 
32 There are no current loss carry-forwards at the time of investment  0 = t .   10 
 
Equity = initial outlay 
0 I = 1,000,000 
Pre-tax interest rate  i = 0.1 
Number of simulated cash flows for each set of parameters  s = 25,000 
Time horizon  n = 10 
Standard deviation of the increments  t ε   σ = 50,000 
Table 1: Parameters of the executed simulations 
Four different future values are computed in each simulation. First, domestic real investment in 
the parent company is compared to foreign real investment in the subsidiary. Second, domestic 
financial investment in the parent company is compared to foreign financial investment in the 
subsidiary. Finally, the investor realises the alternative with the maximum future value. 
Each simulation is carried out without  ) 0 ( ) 1 , 0 ( =
L I  and with group taxation  ) 1 ( ) 1 , 0 ( =
L I . The group 
taxation’s investment effects are quantified by the compiled distributions of future values. 
Moreover, we analyse the influence of repatriation policy in the case of positive exogenous 
domestic income. We compare the difference in future values for retaining profits with and 
without group taxation to the difference in future values for distributing profits with and without 
group taxation. The resulting changes in future values represent the group taxation’s investment 
incentives depending on the dividend policy. 
 
4.2  Simulation results 
Decision between domestic and foreign financial investment 
Since interest yield is deterministic and always positive, group taxation regimes do not influence 
decisions between domestic financial investment in the parent company and foreign financial 
investment in the subsidiary. Financial investments are always carried out in the lower-tax 
country. 
   11 
Decision between domestic and foreign real investment 
As expected, the nominal tax rates also determine the decision between domestic real investment 
in the parent company and foreign real investment in the subsidiary. The impact of group 
taxation on domestic versus foreign real investment, however, is ambiguous. Whether group 
taxation or separate taxation is chosen crucially depends on the expected structure of cash flows 
and the level of domestic income. 
We were surprised by the results for expected marginal investment with increasing cash flows, 
which are often associated with innovative projects. The parameter setting under consideration is 
000 , 100 , 801 , 309 0 = − = µ CF . Without exogenously-given domestic income  ) 0 ( = t DE , opting 
for group taxation reduces the arithmetic mean of the future value of real investment in the 
foreign subsidiary. The reduction can amount to as much as 1.27% (from 2,261,751 to 2,233,054 
for % 19 =
S τ ). This apparently paradoxical effect results from the initial losses that frequently 
arise in this parameter setting. In principle, these foreign initial losses could be set off against 
domestic profits, if there had been any. In our case, however, the group taxation only generates a 
domestic loss carry-forward, which in future periods is subject to the loss deduction limit of 75% 
of current profits
33. The parent company therefore has to pay taxes even in the presence of loss 
carry-forwards. 
This effect is not primarily caused by the lump-sum valuation of expiring loss carry-forwards. It 
also occurs, e.g., for  8 . 0 = β . The average future value decreases from 2,280,462 without group 
taxation to 2,279,506 with group taxation. A reduction may even occur for the maximal, but 
unrealistic value of 1 = β . This kind of group taxation paradox could not occur without the loss-
deduction limit
34. 
For sufficiently high levels of domestic income, which prevent domestic loss carry-forwards, 
these paradoxes do not occur. The group taxation induces an average increase of future values of 
up to 2.2% (for  % 38 , 000 , 50 = =
S
t DE τ ). 
If expected marginal projects with constant cash flows are considered  ) 0 , 745 , 162 ( 0 = = µ CF , 
group taxation only provides negligible investment incentives. The average increase in future 
values that is attributable to group taxation amounts to 0.5%-1.2%. This effect is widely 
                                                 
33 Cf. § 2 (2b) EStG. 
34 See also Pummerer (2004), p. 14. He does not, however, distinguish between different cash flow structures and   12 
independent of the foreign corporate tax rate and the level of domestic income. Since domestic 
real investment is unaffected by the group taxation regime, the average difference in future 
values of foreign and domestic real investment increases accordingly. 
For expected marginal projects with decreasing cash flows  ) 000 , 50 , 018 , 399 ( 0 − = = µ CF , the 
average increase in the future values is far more pronounced, especially for the foreign high-tax 
country. For the parameter setting  % 38 , 0 = =
S
t DE τ , group taxation induces an average 
increase in the future values of  % 12 . 4 1 86 . 394 , 717 , 1
03 . 164 , 788 , 1 = − . In the presence of exogenous domestic 
losses ) 000 , 50 ( − = t DE , the increase even amounts to  % 28 . 4 1 34 . 838 , 114 , 1
85 . 585 , 162 , 1 = − . Due to group 
taxation, the fraction of foreign projects which yield a higher future value than an identical 
domestic project increases from 14.46% to 27.15%  %) 38 , 0 ( = =
S
t DE τ . In the 25,000 cases, 
however, real investment is never realised in the foreign subsidiary, because domestic financial 
investment yields an even higher future value. Despite the substantial increase in the average 
future value the investment decision remains unchanged. 
Looking at expected infra-marginal projects with increasing cash flows 
) 000 , 100 , 043 , 84 ( 0 = − = µ CF , group taxation paradoxes can be observed, too  ) 0 ( = t DE . The 
average reduction of the future value, however, only amounts to 0.2%. For positive exogenous 
domestic income  ) 000 , 50 ( = t DE , group taxation leads to an average increase in future values of 
up to 0.1%. For expected infra-marginal projects with constant cash flows 
) 0 , 503 , 388 ( 0 = = µ CF , the positive impact of group taxation is in the 0.01% region. For 
expected infra-marginal projects with decreasing cash flows  ) 000 , 50 , 776 , 624 ( 0 − = = µ CF , the 
average increase in future values amounts to less than 0.3%. Group taxation never alters the 
decision between domestic and foreign real investment in this parameter setting. The negligible 
magnitude of the investment incentives leads to the conclusion that group taxation regimes may 
be almost irrelevant to expected infra-marginal projects. 
 
Decision between optimal real investment and optimal financial investment 
With regard to the decision between value-maximising real investment and value-maximising 
financial investment, the effects of group taxation are ambiguous. For expected marginal projects 
                                                                                                                                                             
different levels of domestic income.   13 
with constant or decreasing cash flows, the arithmetic mean of the difference of future values 
increases in all parameter settings. In contrast, the effects are ambiguous for expected increasing 
cash flows: Group taxation lowers the mean difference of future values for the low-tax foreign 
country and raises the mean difference of future values for the high-tax foreign country if 
domestic income is non-positive. 
In the case of the low-tax foreign country, the reason for the decrease of the average difference 
of future values is that foreign profits are tax-exempt and cannot be set off against domestic 
losses
35. Domestic loss-offset potential can only be used if domestic investment is carried out or 
if foreign profits are repatriated. In many cases, domestic loss-offset potential compensates for 
the higher domestic tax rate (25% instead of 19% abroad). It may therefore pay off to realise 
investment in the parent company. 
In contrast, the average difference in future values can increase substantially, assuming positive 
exogenous domestic income. This result does not depend on the nominal tax rates. 
If the fraction of positive differences in future values is considered, introducing group taxation 
does not induce significant effects. As a consequence, group taxation seems to offer only 
marginal incentives for real investments. 
As could be expected, group taxation is almost irrelevant to expected infra-marginal projects. It 
induces changes of the average difference of future values between optimal real and optimal 
financial investment of between +0.3% and –0.3%. 
 
Relevance of repatriation policy 
According to equation (7), we assumed that the subsidiary’s distribution policy is exclusively 
determined by nominal tax rates: Profits are fully distributed if the foreign corporate tax rate 
exceeds the domestic one. Otherwise, all profits are retained until the time horizon  n t = . In a 
multi-period setting, such a simple decision rule may produce suboptimal future values as soon 
as exogenous domestic losses coincide with low foreign tax rates. The domestic losses cannot be 
set off against tax-exempt foreign profits and accumulate to the domestic loss carry-forward. 
Since the profit from liquidating the foreign subsidiary is also tax-exempt, the domestic loss 
                                                 
35 If the exogenous domestic income is non-negative, losses do not occur, and domestic and foreign income is 
taxed separately. Hence, the choice of location follows the lower nominal tax rate.   14 
carry-forward can only be valued at the lump-sum fraction β . 
Despite the higher domestic tax rate, it can be efficient to repatriate profits generated by the 
foreign subsidiary in order to use the domestic loss-offset potential. Although the dividends are 
tax-exempt, the positive interest income resulting from re-invested dividends can be set off 
against domestic losses in future periods. 
For this reason, we carried out simulations in the parameter setting  % 19 ; 000 , 50 = − =
S
t DE τ  for 
full distribution as well as for full retention of profits. In all parameter combinations, the 
distribution of profits dominated retention. Full distribution, however, is not necessarily optimal 
in all settings. Finding the globally optimal repatriation policy requires the optimisation of all n 
continuous dividend payments, allowing for restrictions from financial accounting. Due to the 
non-linear algebraic functions induced by asymmetric taxation, these optimisation problems are 
quite complex. Typically, only approximative solutions can be found by direct search methods 
with numerous iterations. In the case of Monte Carlo simulations, these methods are not feasible 
for a sufficient sample size. 
Moreover, the impact of repatriation policy on the effectiveness of the group taxation regime is 
ambiguous. We computed the change in the mean difference of future values with and without 
group taxation which is attributable to improved distribution policy. For expected marginal 
projects with increasing cash flows  , 801 , 309 ( 0 − = CF ) 000 , 100 = µ , the average future value is 
reduced by group taxation. For full distribution, group taxation causes a reduction of the average 
future value, which is 44 less than for full retention. For expected marginal projects with 
constant cash flows  , 745 , 162 ( 0 = CF ) 0 = µ , group taxation increases the average future value. 
For full distribution, the increase of the average future value is 1,416 higher than for full 
retention. For expected marginal projects with decreasing cash flows  , 018 , 399 ( 0 = CF  
) 000 , 50 − = µ  the increase of the average future value resulting from group taxation is even 
22,741 higher than for full retention. As a consequence, improving the dividend policy seems to 
strengthen the group taxation’s effectiveness, as can be seen from table 2:   15 
 
Change in future values of 
expected marginal projects due to 
group taxation 
In the case of 
retained profits  
In the case of 
distributed profits 
Additional influence of 
group taxation regimes 
resulting from a modified 
dividend policy 
  (1)  (2)  (2) – (1) 
with increasing cash flows  –12,318 –12,274 +44
with constant cash flows  +10,808 +12,224 +1,416
with decreasing cash flows  +27,201 +49,942 +22,741
Table 2: Correlation between dividend policy and group taxation 
In this parameter setting, the domestic loss-offset potential compensates for the domestic tax rate 
(25%) which is higher than the foreign tax rate (19%). Obviously, there is a trade-off between 
nominal tax rates and loss-offset potential. Investors are well advised to decide simultaneously 
upon repatriation policy and the option for group taxation. 
Dividend restrictions from financial accounting also affect the group taxation’s effectiveness. In 
general, dividend restrictions in the presence of loss carry-forwards discriminate against real 
investment in the foreign subsidiary. It is obvious that additional restrictions tend to reduce 
future values. The average reduction of the future value differs, however, depending on whether 
group taxation is applied or not. Substantial differences can only be observed for projects with 
starting losses, because loss carry-forwards exclude dividends. For expected marginal projects 
with increasing cash flows  ) 000 , 100 , 801 , 309 ( 0 = − = µ CF , table 3 denotes the average future 
values for the parameters  0 = t DE  and  % 38 =
S τ . Obviously, the disadvantage from dividend 
restrictions is higher when group taxation is applied. 
Future value of real 
investment in the foreign 
subsidiary 
Without dividend 
restriction in the case of 
loss carry-forwards 
With dividend restriction 





Under separate taxation  1,976,287 1,941,172 35,115
Under group taxation  1,974,462 1,922,485 51,977
Disadvantages resulting 
from group taxation 
-1,825 -18,687 Difference: -16,862
Table 3: Correlation between dividend restrictions and group taxation 
For projects with expected constant or decreasing cash flows, the group taxation’s effectiveness   16 
remains widely unchanged by dividend restrictions. Again, this example indicates that deciding 
on group taxation requires the consideration of all known parameters as well as the foreign 
financial accounting rules. In any case, an arbitrary consolidation of all foreign subsidiaries may 
prove financially detrimental. 
 
5  Summary and conclusion 
When evaluating the Austrian group taxation, it should be emphasised that the investment 
incentives strongly depend on the parameter setting under consideration. The most important 
determinants are a project’s expected rate of return and its expected structure of cash flows. The 
magnitude of the group taxation’s investment incentives is summarised in table 4: 
Expected cash flows  Degree of influence of group taxation 
regimes on investment decisions 
Increasing Constant Decreasing 
marginal average  low relatively  high  expected rate of 
return 
high  very low  very low  very low 
Table 4: Relevance of group taxation regimes for investment decisions 
Hence, sensible planning for the establishment of a tax group requires detailed assumptions on 
the possible activities. Obviously, the group taxation’s investment incentives should not be 
overestimated. The future values of the different investment alternatives vary too slightly to 
cause substantial shifts in investment behaviour. A promotion of real investment seems unlikely. 
The dividend policy should be taken into account when deciding whether or not to opt for group 
taxation. Even for subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions, immediate repatriation of profits can be 
efficient to use domestic loss-offset potential. In many cases, there is a trade-off between tax 
rates and loss-offset rules, which means that improved loss-offset potential can compensate for a 
higher nominal tax rate. 
Innovative projects often generate initial losses. Since the Austrian loss deduction limit tends to 
cause group taxation paradoxes, it is not yet clear to which extent the taxpayers will opt for the 
group taxation. Comprehensive tax planning explicitly requires taking exogenous domestic 
income into account. For holding companies without a domestic operating business, group 
taxation seems almost irrelevant, because the dividends received by these corporations are tax-  17 
exempt in Austria
36 and hence cannot be set off against foreign losses. 
Tax planning of projects with starting losses requires an especially thorough analysis. Opting for 
group taxation may prove harmful in the presence of dividend restrictions from financial 
accounting. As a consequence, investors are well advised to plan a project’s expected rate of 
return, its expected structure of cash flows, domestic taxable income and the optimal repatriation 
policy simultaneously prior to establishing a tax group. 
In the light of the model’s complexity, some real-world problems have been neglected here and 
should be subject to further analysis. Integration of the parent company’s shareholders and their 
taxation poses one of these problems. Since these shareholders may be domestic or foreign 
natural persons or corporations, a variety of different cases with different tax consequences may 
arise. 
Apart from the location decision, the parent company can use various other tax minimising 
strategies that we neglected in our model such as, for example, financing policy. As we assume 
equity-financed investments, the only possibility to partially avoid the loss deduction limit for 
the parent company is to pay out dividends. In contrast, if the parent company finances the 
foreign subsidiary with debt instead of equity, the loss deduction limit can be avoided easily. 
Possible thin capitalisation rules have to be taken into account, however, when choosing debt 
finance. 
Summarising, Austrian group taxation is an interesting step towards an integrated taxation of 
corporate groups, especially with regard to the European Court of Justice’s AMID verdict
37 that 
demands cross-border loss-offset within the EU. Our analysis, however, shows ambiguous 
results. In any case, investors are well advised to use multi-period models of capital budgeting, 
preferably for different settings of the state variables. 
 
Appendix: Simulation results 
 
                                                 
36 Cf. § 10 (2, 3) KStG. 
37 Cf. European Court of Justice, judgement of 14.12.2000, Case C-141/99 (AMID), EuGHE 2000 I, 11619; 
VwGH-findings of 25.9.2001, 99/14/0217 E, Internationales Steuerrecht 2001, 754; RL 7605 ff. EStR.   18 
Parameters  Arithmetic mean of future values 
µ   0 CF   t DE  
S τ   ()













Increase in future 
value due to 
group taxation 
Change in future 
value 









Average difference in 
future value 
opt. real investment  
- opt. financial 
investment 
0 162,745 0  19%  0 2,061,032 2,178,999 2,043,935 2,187,668  -143,733 0.00% 8,670 
0 162,745 0  19%  1 2,061,032 2,178,999 2,043,935 2,197,778  0.462% -153,843 0.26% 18,785 
0 162,745 0  38%  0 2,061,032 1,877,119 2,043,935 1,863,110  180,825 86.40% 1,670 
0 162,745 0  38%  1 2,061,032 1,877,119 2,043,935 1,877,039  0,748% 166,896 84.76% 13,881 
0 162,745 -50,000  19%  0 1,530,516 1,525,654 1,458,830 1,522,805  -63,975 33.00% 5,294 
0 162,745 -50,000  19%  1 1,530,516 1,525,654 1,458,830 1,535,030  0.803% -76,199 32.57% 17,347 
0 162,745 -50,000  38%  0 1,530,516 1,234,124 1,458,830 1,211,631  247,199 84.48% -44,493 
0 162,745 -50,000  38%  1 1,530,516 1,234,124 1,458,830 1,223,856  1.009% 234,974 83.76% -33,220 
0 162,745 50,000  19%  0 2,591,547 2,709,514 2,597,678 2,720,073  -122,394 10.16% 12,985 
0 162,745 50,000  19%  1 2,591,547 2,709,514 2,597,678 2,745,406  0.931% -147,727 0.00% 35,891 
0 162,745 50,000  38%  0 2,591,547 2,407,635 2,597,678 2,396,073  201,605 96.17% 9,663 
0 162,745 50,000  38%  1 2,591,547 2,407,635 2,597,678 2,425,128  1.213% 172,550 84.58% 31,159 
-50,000 399,018 0  19%  0 2,061,032 2,178,999 1,903,109 2,094,330  -191,222 0.00% -84,668 
-50,000 399,018 0  19%  1 2,061,032 2,178,999 1,903,109 2,121,495  1.297% -218,387 0.00% -57,503 
-50,000 399,018 0  38%  0 2,061,032 1,877,119 1,903,109 1,717,394  185,715 85.54% -138,701 
-50,000 399,018 0  38%  1 2,061,032 1,877,119 1,903,109 1,788,164  4.121% 114,945 72.85% -101,367 
-50,000 399,018 -50,000  19%  0 1,530,516 1,461,814 1,308,371 1,377,146  -68,775 20.60% -148,409 
-50,000 399,018 -50,000  19%  1 1,530,516 1,461,814 1,308,371 1,404,347  1.975% -95,976 19.51% -121,365 
-50,000 399,018 -50,000  38%  0 1,530,516 1,234,124 1,308,371 1,114,838  193,532 82.71% -196,113 
-50,000 399,018 -50,000  38%  1 1,530,516 1,234,124 1,308,371 1,162,586  4.283% 145,785 75.23% -167,261 
-50,000 399,018 50,000  19%  0 2,591,547 2,709,514 2,472,971 2,627,225  -154,254 0.54% -82,238 
-50,000 399,018 50,000  19%  1 2,591,547 2,709,514 2,472,971 2,676,281  1.867% -203,311 0.00% -33,233 
-50,000 399,018 50,000  38%  0 2,591,547 2,407,635 2,472,971 2,255,193  217,777 94.04% -112,733 
-50,000 399,018 50,000  38%  1 2,591,547 2,407,635 2,472,971 2,347,497  4.093% 125,474 75.18% -71,888 
100,000 -309,801 0 19%  0 2,061,032 2,178,999 2,122,241 2,261,751  -139,510 0.00% 82,753 
100,000 -309,801 0 19%  1 2,061,032 2,178,999 2,122,241 2,233,054  -1.269% -110,813 8.19% 54,812 
100,000 -309,801 0 38%  0 2,061,032 1,877,119 2,122,241 1,941,172  181,069 82.98% 88,085 
100,000 -309,801 0 38%  1 2,061,032 1,877,119 2,122,241 1,922,485  -0.963% 199,756 85.43% 93,221 
100,000 -309,801 -50,000 19%  0 1,530,516 1,461,814 1,493,313 1,544,567  -51,254 36.64% 23,306 
100,000 -309,801 -50,000 19%  1 1,530,516 1,461,814 1,493,313 1,532,250  -0.797% -38,937 50.20% 21,523 
100,000 -309,801 -50,000 38%  0 1,530,516 1,234,124 1,493,313 1,241,468  251,845 80.41% -286 
100,000 -309,801 -50,000 38%  1 1,530,516 1,234,124 1,493,313 1,229,170  -0.991% 264,143 81.82% 6,017 
100,000 -309,801 50,000 19%  0 2,591,547 2,709,514 2,714,980 2,794,064  -79,084 23.16% 92,853 
100,000 -309,801 50,000 19%  1 2,591,547 2,709,514 2,714,980 2,847,383  1.908% -132,403 0.00% 137,869 
100,000 -309,801 50,000 38%  0 2,591,547 2,407,635 2,714,980 2,473,485  241,495 96.10% 127,023 
100,000 -309,801 50,000 38%  1 2,591,547 2,407,635 2,714,980 2,526,804  2.156% 188,176 86.81% 148,492 
 
Table 5: Arithmetic mean of future value and differences in future values   19 
 
Parameters  Frequency of optimal choice of the investment project 
µ   0 CF   t DE  
S τ   ()












0 162,745  0  19%  0 0.00% 49.31% 0.00% 50,69% 
0 162,745  0  19%  1 0.00% 49.33% 0.00% 50.67% 
0 162,745  0  38%  0 49.09% 0.00% 50.91% 0.00% 
0 162,745  0  38%  1 49.09% 0.00% 50.91% 0.00% 
0 162,745  -50,000  19%  0 49.20% 0.00% 5.94% 44.86% 
0 162,745  -50,000  19%  1 49.20% 0.00% 5.94% 44.86% 
0 162,745  -50,000  38%  0 49.26% 0.00% 50.74% 0.00% 
0 162,745  -50,000  38%  1 49.26% 0.00% 50.74% 0.00% 
0 162,745  50,000  19%  0 0.00% 49.31% 0.00% 50.69% 
0 162,745  50,000  19%  1 0.00% 49.30% 0.00% 50.70% 
0 162,745  50,000  38%  0 49.08% 0.00% 50.92% 0.00% 
0 162,745  50,000  38%  1 49.08% 0.00% 50.92% 0.00% 
-50,000 399,018  0  19%  0 0.00% 52.54% 0.00% 47.46% 
-50,000 399,018  0  19%  1 0.00% 52.40% 0.00% 47.60% 
-50,000 399,018  0  38%  0 53.60% 0.00% 46.40% 0.00% 
-50,000 399,018  0  38%  1 53.60% 0.00% 46.40% 0.00% 
-50,000 399,018  -50,000  19%  0 54.60% 0.00% 11.01% 34.39% 
-50,000 399,018  -50,000  19%  1 54.50% 0.00% 11.00% 34.50% 
-50,000 399,018  -50,000  38%  0 55.04% 0.00% 44.96% 0.00% 
-50,000 399,018  -50,000  38%  1 55.04% 0.00% 44.96% 0.00% 
-50,000 399,018  50,000  19%  0 0.00% 52.54% 0.00% 47.46% 
-50,000 399,018  50,000  19%  1 0.00% 52.20% 0.00% 47.80% 
-50,000 399,018  50,000  38%  0 53.27% 0.00% 46.73% 0.00% 
-50,000 399,018  50,000  38%  1 53.27% 0.00% 46.73% 0.00% 
100,000 -309,801  0 19%  0 0.00% 46.36% 0.00% 53.64% 
100,000 -309,801  0 19%  1 0.00% 48.03% 0.00% 51.97% 
100,000 -309,801  0 38%  0 45.54% 0.00% 54.46% 0.00% 
100,000 -309,801  0 38%  1 45.54% 0.00% 54.46% 0.00% 
100,000 -309,801  -50,000 19%  0 47.76% 0.00% 18.89% 33.34% 
100,000 -309,801  -50,000 19%  1 47.76% 0.00% 28.34% 23.89% 
100,000 -309,801  -50,000 38%  0 47.76% 0.00% 52.24% 0.00% 
100,000 -309,801  -50,000 38%  1 47.76% 0.00% 52.24% 0.00% 
100,000 -309,801  50,000 19%  0 0.00% 46.36% 0.00% 53.64% 
100,000 -309,801  50,000 19%  1 0.00% 45.09% 0.00% 54.91% 
100,000 -309,801  50,000 38%  0 43.91% 0.00% 56.09% 0.00% 
100,000 -309,801  50,000 38%  1 43.91% 0.00% 56.09% 0.00% 
Table 6: Relative frequency of optimal choice of the investment project   20 
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